

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4635

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 KINGSTON 1545

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AMGT, JM, US
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART 1

REFERENCE: CERP 0001

1. FOLLOWING IS PART 1 OF THE JAMAICA PARM. PARTS 11 AND
111 ARE BEING SUBMITTED BY SEPTELS.

2. A. U.S. INTERESTS

1. POLITICAL

OUR POLITICAL INTERESTS IN JAMAICA ARISE BILATERALLY
OUT OF OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE ISLAND (SEE BELOW),
REGIONALLY OUT OF OUR CONCERN FOR A STABLE CARIBBEAN SYSTEM,
AND MULTILATERALLY OUT OF GLOBAL CONCERNS -- BUT MOST
PARTICULARLY OUT OF OUR DESIRE AND NEED TO MAINTAIN AN
EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE THIRD WORLD. GIVEN THIS
SET OF INTERESTS, WE MUST NECESSARILY FOCUS OUR ATTENTION ON:

-- THE NEW IMPORTANCE OF THE LEFT WITHIN THE JAMAICAN
GOVERNMENT;

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-- THE INTIMACY AND QUALITY OF CUBAN-JAMAICAN RELATIONS;

-- JAMAICA'S CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY;

-- THE CONSEQUENCES OF A SOVIET PRESENCE IN JAMAICA, SOON TO
BE A REALITY; AND

-- JAMAICA'S DESIRE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD.

2. ECONOMIC

OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAMAICA CENTERS ON OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THEY INCLUDE:

-- DEPENDENCE, FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, ON JAMAICAN BAUXITE AND ALUMINA (WE PRESENTLY IMPORT 51 PERCENT OF OUR BAUXITE AND 24 PERCENT OF OUR ALUMINA FROM JAMAICA);

-- PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN JAMAICA (\$1 BILLION, OF WHICH \$640 MILLION IS INVESTED IN THE BAUXITE/ALUMINA INDUSTRY AND \$425 MILLION IS COVERED BY OPIC GUARANTEES);

-- PRESERVATION AND EXPANSION, AS POSSIBLE, OF A TRADE RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH OUR PROXIMITY AND JAMAICAN PREFERENCE FOR AMERICAN GOODS HAS ALLOWED THE UNITED STATES A 35 TO 40 PERCENT SHARE OF THE MARKET FOR IMPORTED GOODS; AND

-- AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INTENDED TO SUPPORT JAMAICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORTS AS A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.

3. OTHER INTERESTS

IN ADDITION TO OUR CLOSELY INTER-LINKED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, WE HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF
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OTHERS. THEY INCLUDE:

-- IMMIGRATION, SINCE JAMAICA IS THE SIXTH LARGEST SOURCE OF LEGAL IMMIGRANTS AND A SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS;

-- NARCOTICS, SINCE JAMAICA IS A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF MARIJUANA AND MAY BE BECOMING A TRANSIT POINT FOR HARDER DRUGS; AND

-- PROTECTION AND WELFARE OF U.S. NATIONALS, GIVEN THE LARGE RESIDENT AND TRANSIENT AMERICAN COMMUNITY.

4. PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF OUR INTERESTS

PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF OUR INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SIMPLE. THE RISE OF THE LEFT, JAMAICA'S CLOSER TIES WITH "SOCIALIST" NATIONS, AND ITS INTENTION TO PLAY A COMMANDING THIRD WORLD ROLE ALL

PROMISE STRAINS, AND FREQUENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS. JAMAICA'S PARLOUS ECONOMIC STATE AND THE POSSIBLY RADICAL PRESCRIPTION FOR ITS RECOVERY SUGGEST A FURTHER FALL IN INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND A LIMIT ON TRADE IN PRODUCTS OTHER THAN NECESSITIES. TRADE MAY BE FURTHER DIMINISHED AS JAMAICA LOOKS TO NEW SUPPLIERS AND MARKETS DUE PARTLY TO CONSIDERATIONS OF CREDIT AND IDEOLOGY. EVEN OUR PRESENT ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP COULD BE ENDANGERED (OR ITS EXPANSION BLOCKED) IF ABUSES UNDER THE "STATE OF EMERGENCY" OCCUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ARISE. THE EMERGENCE IN JAMAICA OF AN INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME -- A POSSIBILITY WHICH CANNOT BE DISMISSED -- WOULD CONFRONT US WITH A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 KINGSTON 1545

LASTLY, OUR RELATIONS WITH JAMAICA HAVE BEEN ERODED AS THE RESULT OF ALLEGATIONS REGARDING AMERICAN ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS HERE; THESE HAVE FOUND MOST DRAMATIC EXPRESSION IN THE CHARGES BY JAMAICAN LEADERS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ENDEAVORING TO "DESTABLIZE" JAMAICA.

2. B. OVERVIEW

1. ALTHOUGH OUR INTERESTS ARE LIMITED AND WELL-UNDERSTOOD, THEIR PROTECTION AND PROMOTION IS NO SIMPLE TASK. DEFINING THE OBJECTIVES WE SEEK AND THE CONCOMITANT COURSES OF ACTIONS WE SHOULD FOLLOW HAS BECOME COMPLEX. THIS IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE JAMAICA HAS BEGUN A PROCESS OF EXTENSIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, AND THE CHARACTER OF THE POLITY,

SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WHICH WILL EMERGE IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT.

2. BY PRESENT INDICATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA INTENDS:

-- SOCIALLY, TO END THE DISPARITIES IN INCOME, STATUS AND OPPORTUNITY WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED JAMAICA'S SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

-- POLITICALLY, TO MAKE IRREVERSIBLE THE PROCESS OF "DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM" THROUGH
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MOTIVATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL INDOCTRINATION IN WHICH EGALITARIANISM WILL BE PROMINENT.

-- ECONOMICALLY, TO TAKE UNDER STATE CONTROL THE "COMMANDING HEIGHTS" OF THE ECONOMY AND, TO MAINTAIN THE ORDERLY PROCESS OF CHANGE NECESSARY TO EFFECT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES.

-- CONSTITUTIONALLY, TO ESTABLISH A REPUBLIC, THEREBY SYMBOLICALLY CASTING OFF THE FINAL VESTIGES OF "COLONIALISM" AND "IMPERIALISM."

3. THE PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS, OR SUCCESS BY THE JAMAICANS IN ACHIEVING THEM, DO NOT IN THEMSELVES POSE A PROBLEM FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS. HOWEVER, WHEN THESE ASPIRATIONS ARE RELATED TO JAMAICA'S INCREASINGLY DESPERATE ECONOMIC SITUATION, IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT SERIOUS PROBLEMS LIE IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. SPECIFICALLY,

-- FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES ARE UNLIKELY TO HOLD OUT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR, THEREBY FORCING THE NATION INTO DEBT-RE-SCHEDULING.

-- UNEMPLOYMENT WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ITS PRESENT 25 PERCENT LEVEL.

-- PRODUCTION IS LIKELY TO DROP BY UP TO 20 PERCENT AS A RESULT OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS.

--INFLATION WILL EXCEED 20 PERCENT AS A RESULT OF ENORMOUS BUDGET DEFICITS.

4. DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PARM WE ANTICIPATE THAT THESE PROBLEMS WILL BRING ABOUT MAJOR SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS, POSSIBLE FOOD SHORTAGES, A MAJOR DROP IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING, AND INCREASED CIVIL DISSENT, POSSIBLY FLARING INTO SPORADIC OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. THE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE WHICH JAMAICA

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RECEIVES DURING THE PERIOD CAN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE EXTENT OF THIS FERMENTATION. IT IS DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, THAT SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING TO TIEHR TURN THE ECONOMY AROUND OR EVEN TO STABILIZE IT AT A LOW LEVEL. EVEN IF UNLIMITED ASSISTANCE WERE AVAILABLE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT JAMAICA'S HUMAN AND STRUCTURAL RESOURCES WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK. AS A RESULT, IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE GOJ WILL BE ABLE TO MEET MOST, IF ANY, OF ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIAL OBJECTIVES. THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND ON ITS VIEW OF ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD. U.S.-JAMAICAN RELATIONS WILL BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED.

5. IN THIS SITUATION, THE COUNTRY MUST INEVITABLY FACE A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTORY PRESSURES. IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS WILL COME INTO CONFLICT WITH ECONOMIC REALITY AND THE POSSIBLE WHOLESale DEPENDENCE ON THE ASSISTANCE OF "THE METROPOLITAN POWERS". RADICALS CAN BE EXPECTED TO CHALLENGE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH "IMPERIALIST AND CAPITALIST FORCES" (LIKE THE U.S. AND THE IMF) WHILE ADVOCATING A "SELF-RELIANCE" COURSE. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A SEARCH FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SCAPEGOATS. MODERATES, IN CONTRAST, WILL ADVOCATE GESTURES OF FRIENDSHIP TOWARD THE U.S. AND MAY ALSO ARGUE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH IMF POLICIES AND PRESCRIPTIONS. STRAINS WILL

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 6 KINGSTON 1545

DEVELOP OVER:

-- THE LEVEL OF SUPPRESSION IF IT SHOULD BE NEEDED TO QUELL
CIVIL UNREST;

-- THE IMPULSE TO ADOPT A ONE-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM, IF THE
PNP IS TO KEEP POWER;

-- THE DEGREE OF GOVERNMENT TAKEOVERS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR;

-- THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA.

6. THE PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF U.S.
INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK WILL BE EXTRAORDIN-
ARILY COMPLEX. WE MUST DETERMINE WHAT LEVEL OF
ASSISTANCE WE CAN AFFORD, HOW MUCH WE WISH TO
COMMIT OURSELVES TO, AND WHAT EFFECT IT WILL HAVE.
WE MUST AVOID BECOMING THE ARCHITECTS OF OUR OWN
UNDOING BY EITHER DENYING BADLY NEEDED ASSISTANCE OR
BY IMPLYING A WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO
MORE THAN WE CAN ACTUALLY DELIVER. WE MUST TRY TO
BE SUPPORTIVE OF THOSE MODERATES WHOSE EFFORTS AID
OUR INTERESTS; AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST CAREFULLY
AVOID OPENING OURSELVES UP TO THE CHARGE OF INTER-
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VENTION IN JAMAICA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. FINALLY, AS
THE CONOMOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, WE SHOULD TAKE
CARE THAT WE NOT BE IN A POSITION IN WHICH WE BECOME
THE SCAPEGOAT AND IN WHICH THE BLAME IS LAID AT OUR
FEET. WITHIN THESE CONSTRAINTS WE SHOULD TRY TO
DEVELOP A LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT
OF JAMAICA WHICH WILL BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
BASIC INTERESTS WE HAVE OUTLINED HEREIN.

4. C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

1. RESTORATION OF EFFECTIVE U.S.-JAMAICAN RELATIONS

THIS IS THE MOST PRESSING NEED IF WE ARE
TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN JAMAICA, BUT
IS NOT AN OBJECTIVE WE CAN HOPE TO ATTAIN UNILATER-
ALLY. IT MUST ALSO BE A MAJOR JAMAICAN OBJECTIVE
BACKED BY A WILL TO REACH ACCOMMODATION IN AREAS OF
CONFLICT. FOR OUR PART, WE CAN BEST DEMONSTRATE OUR
DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BY:

(A) PROMOTION OF AND RECEPTIVITY TO EFFORTS TO EXPAND AND MAINTAIN DIALOGUE. THIS MUST TOUCH ON ALL ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH CANDOR. WHILE WE MUST DISPLAY A SENSITIVE AWARENESS OF JAMAICA'S OWN SET OF INTERESTS AND ITS CONCEPT OF ITS PLACE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD, WE MUST ALSO LEAVE THE JAMAICANS IN NO DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY REGARDING OR INTERESTS AND CONCERNS.

(B) RECEPTIVITY TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.
AGAIN, CANDOR WILL BE IMPORTANT. WE MUST LEAVE THE JAMAICANS IN NO DOUBT REGARDING FINANCIAL AND OTHER LIMITATIONS ON OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. NOR SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED TO BELIEVE WE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THREATS OR CAJOLERY. MOREOVER, WE MUST INSURE THAT THE JAMAICANS UNDERSTAND THAT AN ADVERSE
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CONGRESSIONAL REACTION COULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NEGATIVE POLITICAL ACTIONS ON THEIR PART. WE SHOULD URGE ON THE JAMAICANS AND OTHER APPROPRIATE DONOR COUNTRIES THE WISDOM OF A CONSORTIUM APPROACH SO THAT ASSISTANCE FUNDS MAY BE USED COHERENTLY AND MOST EFFECTIVELY.

UNLESS SOUNDER RELATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED, THE PURSUIT OF OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES WILL BE PROBLEMATICAL.

2. SEEK JAMAICAN SUPPORT ON MATTERS OF CRITICAL INTEREST TO THE U.S. IN MULTILATERAL FORA.

OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN SUCH SUPPORT WILL DEPEND IN GREAT MEASURE ON THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH JAMAICA AND, GIVEN ITS IDENTIFICATION WITH THIRD WORLD CONCERNS, MUST INEVITABLY BE LESS THAN COMPLETE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE JAMAICANS TO SEEK MODERATE AND EVOLUTIONARY SOLUTIONS IF COOPERATION BETWEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, DCS AND LDCS IS TO BE MAXIMIZED. WE SHOULD URGE PRAGMATISM AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL RATHER THAN IDEOLOGY OR WISHFUL THINKING. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY TO ISSUES OF PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS ARE NOT IN CONFLICT, E.G. PUERTO RICO OR THE KOREAN QUESTION. ASIDE FROM THESE AREAS, WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT MUCH.

3. SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTERESTS

THIS INCLUDES:

(A) PRESERVING ACCESS TO JAMAICAN BAUXITE AND ALUMINA AT ACCEPTABLE PRICES.

THIS IS A SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE; ALTERNATIVE
SOURCES COULD BECOME AVAILABLE WITHIN
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FIVE YEARS, SINCE BAUXITE AND ALUMINA
CONSTITUTE 31 PERCENT OF JAMAICA'S
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, WE ANTI-
CIPATE THAT JAMAICAN SELF-INTEREST
REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR PRO-
BLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, A DESIRE TO DIVERSI-
FY TRADE RELATIONS TO INCLUDE EASTERN
EUROPE COULD COMPLICATE THIS MATTER.
(B) SUPPORTING, AS APPROPRIATE, AMERICAN
ALUMINUM COMPANIES OPEATING IN JAMAICA.
CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
THE JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT AND ALCOA,
KAISER, AND REYNOLDS SUGGESTS THE COM-
PANIES ARE, IN MOST CASES, WELL ABLE
TO PROTECT THEMSELVES. (RE REVERE,
SEE D. MAJOR ISSUES, (BELOW)
(C1) MAINTANING A FAVORABLE AND NON-DIS-
CRIMINATORY CLIMATE FOR TRADE AND
INVESTMENT.

PRESERVATION OF TRADE IS LARGELY

DEPENDENT ON THE STATE OF THE JAMAICAN
ECONOMY. NOW GRIEVOUSLY ILL, THE RESULT
IS REDUCED TRADE; RESTORED TO BETTER
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HEALTH THE OUTLOOK WOULD IMPROVE.
HOWEVER, PROSPECTS ARE POOR, NOTWITH-
STANDING MAJOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL NECESSARILY
HAVE LIMITED SCOPE. JAMAICA WILL SEEK
TO DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCES OF IMPORTS,
BUT THE ULTIMATE DETERMINANT WILL BE
THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT
RATHER THAN THE SUITABILITY OF GOODS.
(C2) RE INVESTMENT, THE STATE OF THE
THE ECONOMY, THE UNCERTAIN POLITICAL
CLIMATE, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ETATIST
ATTITUDE CONTINUE TO MILITATE AGAINST
PRIVATE U.S. INVESTMENT. IF THE
GOVERNMENT NARROWS THE ROLE GRANTED TO
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN ITS PURSUIT OF
"DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM", OR ADOPTS
EXTREME ECONOMIC MEASURES, CHARGES OF
EXPROPRIATION MAY ARISE. HOPEFULLY,
THE LEVEL AND CHARACTER OF AN EXPANDED
U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL PROMOTE
CAUTION IN THIS AREA.

4. INCREASED JAMAICAN COOPERATION IN THE
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION OF NARCOTICS
TRAFFIC.

OWING TO HIGHER JAMAICAN PRIORITIES AND
CONFUSION IN THE MINDS OF JAMAICANS VIS-A-VIS U.S.
PRIORITIES REGARDING MARIJUANA AND OTHER DRUGS,
JAMAICAN COOPERATION IN THIS AREA HAS ALMOST CEASED
TO EXIST. IF INTERDICTION OF LARGE-SCALE MARIJUANA
EXPORTS IS INDEED AN IMPORTANT PRIORITY FOR TH
USE, WE MUST SO CONVINCE THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE
JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT. THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT.
EQUALLY, IF JAMAICA IS BECOMING A TRANSIT POINT FOR
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HARDER DRUGS, THE EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED IN A
CONVINCING MANNER TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE
JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT.

5. REDUCTION IN FRAUDULENT OR ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO
THE U.S. OF JAMAICANS.

THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT THE EMBASSY POSESS
ADEQUATE CONSULAR STAFF-- AND APPROPRIATE PHYSICAL
FACILITIES-- TO PERMIT EVEN CLOSER SCRUTINY OF NIV
AND IV APPLICATIONS.

6. MAJOR ISSUES

A. JAMAICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES.

THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT IN 1976 OUT OF
A MIX OF MISTAKEN CONVICTION AND POLITICAL OPPOR-
TUNISM, PROMOTED THE VIEW THAT THE U.S. ENGAGED IN
A CAMPAIGN TO "DESTABILIZE" JAMAICA. (THE ALLEGED
AIMS OF THIS CAMPAIGN WERE TO PREVENT THE FURTHER
GROWTH OF TIES WITH CUBA, A CONCOMITANT EXTENSION
OF CUBAN INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, AND TO UNDER-
MINE JAMAICA'S "DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST" COURSE).
HOWEVER, THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC DECLINE SHARPLY IN
LATE 1976, AND THE MANLEY GOVERNMENT IS NOW EXER-
CISING RESTRAINT--WHATEVER IT MAY ACTUALLY BELIEVE
ABOUT THE PAST. THE MUTING OF ANTI-US RHETORIC
CLEARLY IS LINKED TO A JAMAICAN BELIEFT THAT:

(1) THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS MORE
SYMPATHETIC TO JAMAICAN AND THIRD
WORLD CONCERNS, AND
(2) JAMAICA REQUIRES EXPANDED U.S.
ASSISTANCE. IF WE ARE TO HAVE MORE
EFFECTIVE RELATIONS WITH JAMAICA, WE
SHOULD BE PERSUADED THAT THIS CAMPAIGN
WILL NOT BE RENEWED, AND THAT OUR
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INTERESTS AND CONCERNS WILL BE
GIVEN CONSIDERED ATTENTION.

B. THE CHARACTER OF ASSISTANCE TO JAMAICA.

(1) THIS REQUIRES ANSWERS TO THREE QUESTIONS. CAN U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE STABILITY IN JAMAICA? SHALL OUR AID BE DEVELOPMENTAL OR HUMANITARIAN IN CHARACTER? SHALL IT BE EXTENDED BILATERALLY OR MULTILATERALLY?

(2) REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION, IT IS FAIR TO ASSUME THAT IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY BEYOND REALISTIC U.S. ASSISTANCE CAPABILITIES TO SINGLEHANDEDLY PULL JAMAICA OUT OF ITS PARLOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION, OR ALONE TO EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY. SINGLEHANDEDLY WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ONLY A SLIGHT IMPACT. THE PROBLEM IS SUCH THAT A MAJOR MULTILATERAL OR CONSORTIUM EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED. BUT EVEN THIS WILL NOT PRODUCE A STATUS QUO FORM OF STABILITY. THE MOST EFFECTIVE RESULTS WE MIGHT REALIZE

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SONABLY OBTAIN FROM SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE THE AMELIORATION OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF JAMAICA'S CONVULSIVE PROCESS OF CHANGE ON THE U.S. INTERESTS IDENTIFIED HEREIN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM AT A LOW LEVEL. FULL JAMAICAN COOPERATION IS, OF COURSE, A PRE-REQUISITE TO EVEN THIS LIMITED FORM OF SUCCESS.

(3) WERE THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC CONDITION LESS SERIOUS, WE WOULD DEEM DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE THE ONLY NEED. HOWEVER, SEVERE SHORTAGES OF FOOD MAY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS,

AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO EMPHASIZE
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

(4) REGARDING THE THIRD QUESTION, JAMAICA
WILL DOUBTLESS PREFER THAT WE-- AND
OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES-- PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE ON A SOLELY BILATERAL
BASIS. IN FACT, SOME BILATERAL
ASSISTANCE WILL INEVITABLY CON-
TINUE. WE MUST, HOWEVER, ALSO INSURE
THAT SOME KIND OF "AID TO JAMAICA CON-
SORTIUM" IS CREATED, PERHPAS UNDER THE
AEGIS OF THE IBRD. THE CONSORTIUM
APPROACH SHOULD PERMIT BETTER COORDINA-
TED AND MORE RATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.
MOREOVER, IT WILL ALLOW US TO MINIMIZE
THE IRRITANTS WHICH ARISE OUT OF A
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE RELATION-
SHIP. ADOPTION OF THE CONSORTIUM
APPROACH ON THE OTHER HAND WILL REDUCE
OUR ABILITY TO USE OUR ASSISTANCE AS A
LEVER TO RESTRAIN THE JAMAICANS
IF THEY RENEW "DESTABILIZATION" OR
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SIMILAR CHARGES. HOWEVER, SUCH LINKAGES
SELDOM WORK WELL, AND IN THE JAMAICAN
CASE WOULD HAVE THE ADDED DEFECT OF
OFFERING THE RADICALS IN THE MANLEY
GOVERNMENT A SEEMING SUBSTANTIA-
TION OF THEIR CHARGES. WE DO NOT
BELIEVE THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF
A UNILATERAL ASSISTANCE RELATION-
SHIP WOULD APPROACH THE CLEAR BENE-
FITS OF THE CONSORTIUM APPROACH.
C. HUMAN RIGHTS.

1) THERE IS A DANGER THAT JAMAICA MAY BE
FORCED OR DRIFT INTO AUTHORITARIANISM.
INDEED, MORE EXTREME ECONOMIC MEASURES
TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT CRISIS MAY
LEAD TO VARIOUS FORMS OF REPRESSION.
THE " STATE OF EMERGENCY" ESTABLISHED IN
JUNE, 1976 GRANTS THE JAMAICAN GOVERN-
MENT EXTRORDINARY POWER TO DEAL WITH
SUCH A SITUATION, BUT IN A FASHION
WHICH UNDERMINES ACCEPTED HUMAN RIGHTS.
THE DRIFT INTO AUTHORITARIANISM MAY
HAVE BEEN GIVEN FURTHER IMPETUS BY
REASON OF THE VIRTUAL ECLIPSE OF THE
OPPOSITION JAMAICAN LABOUR PARTY IN THE

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DECEMBER 1976 GENERAL ELECTION AND THE MARCH, 1977 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS. THIS TREND HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A RISE TO INFLUENCE WITHIN THE RULING PNP AND THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF OF YOUNG RADICAL LEFTISTS -- WITH LITTLE COMMITMENT TO A MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. EMERGENCE OF A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM NOW SEEMS A PROBABILITY WITH A POSSIBLE ACCOMPANYING SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

2) WHILE WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT WE NOT LINK DIRECTLY OUR ASSISTANCE TO A RANGE OF SPECIFIC ISSUES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, WE ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO LINK OUR SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESERVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THUS, AS PART OF OUR DISCUSSION OF FUTURE ASSISTANCE WITH THE JAMAICANS, WE SHOULD MAKE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE VIS-A-VIS HUMAN RIGHTS AND OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO SEEK EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY.

D. THE REVERE CASE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAMAICA AND THE REVERE CORPORATION HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN A DISPUTE (AND MORE RECENTLY, LITIGATION) SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF THE BAUXITE LEVY IN 1974. REVERE HAS FILED A CLAIM AGAINST OPIC FOR COMPENSATION, ALLEGING THAT THE
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BAUXITE LEVY WAS TANTAMOUNT TO EXPROPRIATION. DURING
1977, THE REVERE CASE SHOULD WORK ITS WAY THROUGH
THE JAMAICAN COURTS AND OPIC'S LIABILITY SHOULD BE
DETERMINED. THE USG SHOULD STAND READY TO ASSIST
IN ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BUT SHOULD NOT LINK ITS
INTERESTS IRREVOCABLY TO EITHER REVERE OR OPIC
CONCERNS. FOR THE TIME BEING, U.S. INTERESTS WOULD
DICTATE THAT WE MAINTAIN A WATCHING BRIEF RATHER THAN
AN ACTIVIST ROLE.
GERARD

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
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Concepts: CERP 0001
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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977KINGST01545
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770117-0265
Format: TEL
From: KINGSTON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770492/aaaadbyc.tel
Line Count: 720
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 14
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART 1
TAGS: PFOR, AMGT, PARM, JM, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/173c01ab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009